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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the Colorado Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a 
case contesting the constitutionality of the Choice Scholarship Pilot 
                                                                                                                 
* Professor of Education, University of Wisconsin-Madison.  I am grateful to the 
participants of the 2014 Cooper-Walsh Colloquium for their insightful reactions and 
recommendations.  I also wish to acknowledge the work and assistance of Shannon 
Azzaro, Lauren Irby, and all the staff of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for their 
helpful comments and suggestions in the development of this Article. 
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Program established by the Douglas County School District.1   The 
program is a locally created voucher program that permits the use of 
public tax dollars to subsidize the tuition costs of private school 
enrollment.2   Taxpayers challenged the program alleging it violated 
the Colorado Constitution’s education provisions.3 
During those arguments, Chief Justice Nancy Rice asked the 
attorney defending the program: “Is this a paradigm shift?  Are you 
saying public education is just a funding mechanism? . . .  Is all 
education now public [and parents] can just choose?”4 
As this exchange illustrates, the introduction of publicly funded 
private school choice provisions calls into question what is “public” 
about “public education.”  Distinctions that once were clear—public 
school versus private school—become blurred.  For example, Tony 
Evers, Wisconsin Superintendent of Public Education, noted that the 
average private school participating in the Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program (MPCP) enrolls more than eighty percent of its 
students by means of a publicly funded voucher and posed the 
following question: “If only one in five students enrolled in a choice 
school pays tuition, then when do choice schools stop being private 
schools and become something else?”5  These same statistics 
prompted the American Civil Liberties Union and Disability Rights 
Wisconsin to characterize the MPCP participating schools as “private 
in name only.”6 
Whether voucher programs alter the nature of the participating 
schools from private school to some quasi-public or quasi-private 
form of school is a provocative question.  However, the more 
important question is what such programs mean for a child’s right to 
an education.  State constitutions uniformly make some provision of 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 13SC233, 2014 
WL 1046020, at *1 (Colo. Mar. 17, 2014). 
 2. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., Nos. 11CA1856 & 
11CA1857, 2013 WL 791140 (Colo. App. Feb. 28, 2013), cert. granted Taxpayers for 
Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 13SC233, 2014 WL 1046020, at *1 (Colo. 
Mar. 17, 2014), 
 3. See id. 
 4. Nicholas Garcia, In Douglas County Voucher Case, Supreme Court Wonders 
What Defines a Public School, CHALKBEAT COLO. (Dec. 10, 2014, 5:35 PM), 
http://co.chalkbeat.org/2014/12/10/in-douglas-county-voucher-case-supreme-court-
wonders-what-defines-a-public-school/. 
 5. Letter from Tony Evers, Wis. State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, to 
Members of the Joint Comm. on Fin. 2 (May 23, 2011). 
 6. See Complaint to the U.S. Dep’t of Justice at 27, ACLU v. Wisconsin (June 7, 
2011), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/complaint_
to_doj_re_milwaukee_voucher_program_final.pdf. 
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public education, sketching the contours of that right and directing 
state legislatures to provide it.7  As such, the question becomes 
whether a state’s subsidy of private education compromises that 
state’s ability to fulfill its obligation to establish and fund public 
schools consistent with each state’s constitutional mandates.  In other 
words, at what point, if any, does a state’s funding of private 
education subvert its constitutional obligation to provide adequately 
for public education, thereby converting a child’s right to an 
education to merely the right to shop for one? 
This Article explores that question in relation to state 
constitutional directives for those states currently operating some 
form of voucher program.  This analysis reviews case law and 
explores the issues raised by litigation.  Given the increased attention 
by state legislatures being paid to voucher programs and school 
choice funded by tax credit scholarship programs and education 
savings accounts, these questions have renewed currency and 
application.  Part I reviews the prevalence of voucher, tuition tax 
credit scholarship programs, and education savings account programs 
across the country.  Part II briefly describes judicial findings with 
respect to the constitutionality of the programs under state 
constitution education clauses.  Finally, Part III provides discussion 
and conclusions regarding voucher and voucher-like programs in 
relation to state constitutional guarantees of a right to a public 
education. 
I.  PREVALENCE OF VOUCHERS AND VOUCHER-LIKE PROGRAMS 
While publicly funded private school voucher programs have not 
fared well when placed on ballots,8 school choice proponents have 
achieved much better success through legislative enactment.  In fact, 
the prevalence of voucher and voucher-like programs has steadily 
increased since the Wisconsin Legislature enacted the first publicly 
funded private school voucher plan, the MPCP, in 1990.9  Publicly 
funded support for private education typically comes in three forms: 
(1) publicly funded vouchers; (2) tuition tax credit scholarship 
                                                                                                                 
 7. State Constitutions and Public Education Governance, EDUC. COMMISSION 
STATES, http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/17/03/1703.htm (last updated Oct. 2000). 
 8. See, e.g., Utah School Vouchers, Referendum 1 (2007), BALLOTPEDIA, http://
ballotpedia.org/Utah_School_Vouchers,_Referendum_1_(2007) (last visited Mar. 1, 
2015) (noting that voters defeated a proposed voucher program 62.14% to 37.86%). 
 9. 1989 Wis. Act 336 (codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 2014)) 
(creating the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program). 
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programs; and (3) education savings account programs.10  Voucher 
programs permit the use of public tax dollars to support all or part of 
the tuition costs of enrolling a child in a private school.11  Parents of 
eligible students direct the funds by selecting the private school the 
child will attend.12  Tuition tax credit scholarship programs, also called 
neo-vouchers,13 permit individuals, corporations, or both to receive a 
tax credit in exchange for a donation to a state-approved scholarship 
program that then provides vouchers to eligible children to attend 
private schools.14  Education savings accounts allow parents to divert 
all or part of the state school funding earmarked for their child to an 
account, which can then be used to pay for various approved 
educational expenses, including private school tuition.15 The end, a 
subsidy for private school tuition, is the same in all three types of 
programs.  In voucher programs, the funds flow directly from state 
coffers to parents in the form of a voucher that can only be spent at a 
private school participating in the program.16  In tuition tax credit 
programs, funds are funneled to parents through “scholarships” 
established for the sole purpose of collecting and dispersing 
educational tax credits.17  In education savings account programs, 
state support for a parent’s child is channeled into a special account 
maintained by the state and established for the purpose of paying 
educational expenses.18 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See EXPLORING THE SCHOOL CHOICE UNIVERSE: EVIDENCE AND 
RECOMMENDATIONs (Gary Miron et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter EXPLORING THE 
SCHOOL CHOICE UNIVERSE]; Arianna Prothero, What’s the Difference between 
Vouchers and Education Savings Accounts? EDUC. WK.’S BLOGS (June 9, 2015, 5:17 
PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice/2015/06/school_vouchers_
education_savings_accounts_difference_between.html; What States Are Doing, 
EDUC. COMMISSION STATES, http://www.ecs.org/html/IssueSection.asp?issueid=22&
subissueid=333&ssID=0&s=What+States+Are+Doing (last visited June 25, 2015). 
 11. EXPLORING THE SCHOOL CHOICE UNIVERSE, supra note 10; What States are 
Doing, supra note 10; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 
(1962). 
 12. See sources cited supra note 11. 
 13. See KEVIN G. WELNER, NEOVOUCHERS: THE EMERGENCE OF TUITION TAX 
CREDITS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLING (2008). 
 14. Id.; see also Stephen D. Sugarman, Tax Credit School Scholarship Plans, 43 
J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2014). 
      15. See Prothero, supra note 10; see also Arianna Prothero, Some States Put 
Parents In Charge of Student Spending, EDUC. WK. (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.ed
week.org/ew/articles/2015/02/25/some-states-put-parents-in-charge-of.html. 
 16. See sources cited supra note 11. 
 17. See sources cited supra note 14. 
      18. See sources cited supra note 15. 
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As Table 1 depicts, twenty-four states now have some type of 
voucher program or voucher-like program, but only seven programs 
are more than a decade old,19 and fifteen programs have been enacted 
since just 2013.20  Twelve of the twenty-four states have created two or 
more choice programs.21  Three distinct types of traditional voucher 
programs exist: (1) programs that serve children with disabilities 
(twelve programs in ten states);22 (2) programs that are limited to a 
specific location (three states);23 and (3) statewide voucher programs 
(five states).24  In addition, sixteen states have created tuition tax 
credit programs that transform tax liability into voucher-like 
scholarships for eligible children to attend private schools.25  Arizona 
adopted the first of this type of school choice program in 1997.26  It is 
interesting to note that while voucher programs are older, neo-
vouchers (tuition tax credit programs) now equal them in number.  
Finally, five states have created education savings account programs,27 
the newest voucher-like program to emerge. Once again, Arizona was 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See infra Table 1: Arizona (Individual Income Tax Credit); Florida (John M. 
McKay Scholarship; Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program); Ohio (Cleveland 
Scholarship and Tutoring Program; Autism Scholarship Program); Pennsylvania 
(Educational Improvement Tax Credit); and Wisconsin (Milwaukee Parental Choice 
Program). 
 20. See infra Table 1: Alabama (Alabama Accountability Act Tax Credit); 
Arkansas (Succeed Scholarship Program for Students with Disabilities); Florida 
(Personal Learning Scholarship Account Program); Kansas (Tax Credit for Low 
Income Students Scholarship Program); Mississippi (Mississippi Speech Language 
Therapy Scholarship (Nate Rogers) Program; Equal Opportunity for Students with 
Special Needs Scholarship); Montana (Tax Credits for Contributions to Student 
Scholarship Organizations); Nevada (Nevada Education Savings Accounts; 
Educational Choice Scholarship Program); New Hampshire (School Choice 
Scholarship Program); North Carolina (Special Education Scholarship Grants for 
Children with Disabilities; Opportunity Scholarships); Ohio (Income Based 
Scholarship Program); South Carolina (Educational Credit for Exceptional Needs 
Children); Tennessee (Individualized Education Account Program); and Wisconsin 
(Wisconsin Parental Choice Program). 
 21. See infra Table 1: Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 
 22. See infra Table 1: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah. 
 23. See infra Table 1: Colorado, Ohio, and Wisconsin. 
 24. See infra Table 1: Indiana, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin. 
 25. See infra Table 1: Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia. 
 26. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1089, 43-1089.01 (2012). 
      27. See infra Table 1: Arizona, Florida, Mississippi, Nevada, and Tennessee.  
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the first state to enact legislation to create this type of parental school 
choice.28  
TABLE 1: VOUCHER AND VOUCHER-LIKE PROGRAMS ACROSS 
THE UNITED STATES29 
Program Title & Year 
Enacted 
Statutory Reference Program Type 
Alabama - Alabama 
Accountability Act Tax 
Credit (2013) 
ALA. CODE §§ 16-6D-4 
to -9 (2013). 
Tax credit scholarship 
Arizona - Individual 
Income Tax Credit 
(1997) 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 43-1089 (2012); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-
1089.01 (2012) 
(amended 2015). 
Tax credit scholarship 
Arizona - Low Income 
Corporate Tax Credit 
(2006) 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 20-224.06 (2010); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 43-1183 (2012). 
 
Tax credit scholarship 
Arizona - Lexie’s Law 
Corporate Tax Credits 
(2009) 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 20-224.07 (2010); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 43-1184 (2012); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-
891 (2014). 
Tax credit scholarship 
 
 
Arizona - 
Empowerment 
Scholarship Account 
(2011) 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 15-2401 to -2404 
(2014). 
Education savings 
account 
 
                                                                                                                 
      28. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-2401 to -2404 (2014).  
 29. This table was compiled from information taken from School Choice 
Programs, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE, http://www.edchoice.org/School-
Choice/School-Choice-Programs (last visited June 24, 2015) and verified by 
comparing that list with the databases maintained by the EDUCATION COMMISSION OF 
THE STATES, http://www.ecs.org/html/IssueSection.asp?issueid=22&subissueid=333&
ssID=0&s=What+States+Are+Doing.  This table omits Maine and Vermont, both of 
which have had longstanding tuition programs in rural districts that do not operate 
high schools.  Parents may enroll their children in neighboring school districts, and 
the resident district pays a form of tuition on behalf of the students.  This practice 
was later expanded to allow enrollment in private non-religious schools on the same 
basis. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20-A, § 5204 (2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 821, 822 
(West 2014). 
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Program Title & Year 
Enacted 
Statutory Reference Program Type 
Arizona - Switcher 
Individual Income Tax 
Credit Scholarship 
(2012) 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 43-1089.03 (2012). 
Tax credit scholarship 
Arkansas – Succeed 
Scholarship Program 
for Students with 
Disabilities (2015) 
2015 Ark. Acts 1178. Special education 
voucher 
Colorado – Douglas 
County School 
District—Choice 
Scholarship Pilot 
Program (2011) 
NA30 City-specific voucher 
Florida - John M. 
McKay Scholarship 
(1999) 
FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1002.39 (2014); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 1002.421 
(2013). 
Special education 
voucher 
Florida - Florida Tax 
Credit Scholarship 
Program (2001) 
FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 1102.395 (2014), 
1002.421 (2013). 
Tax credit scholarship 
 
Florida – Personal 
Learning Scholarship 
Account Program 
(2014) 
FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§1002.385 (2014). 
Education savings 
account – Special 
education only 
Georgia – Georgia 
Special Needs 
Scholarship Program 
(2007) 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-
2-2110 to -2118 (2000–
2014). 
Special Education 
voucher 
Georgia - Qualified 
Educational Expense 
Tax Credit (2008) 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-
2A-1 to -7 (2011–2013). 
Tax credit scholarship 
                                                                                                                 
 30. The only voucher program in Colorado exists in the Douglas County School 
District and was enacted by the school board at the local level.  It was not created by 
the state legislature as were the other programs summarized by Table 1. See 
Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., Nos. 11CA1856 & 11CA1857, 
2013 WL 791140 (Colo. App. Feb. 28, 2013), cert. granted Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. 
v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 13SC233, 2014 WL 1046020, at *1 (Colo. Mar. 17, 
2014). 
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Program Title & Year 
Enacted 
Statutory Reference Program Type 
Indiana - School 
Scholarship Tax Credit 
(2009) 
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-
3.1-30.5 – 30.5, 20-51 
(West 2009). 
 
Tax credit scholarship 
 
Indiana - Choice 
Scholarship Program 
(2011) 
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-
51 (West 2011). 
State-wide voucher 
Iowa - School Tuition 
Organization Tax 
Credit (2006) 
IA. CODE ANN. 
§ 422.11S (West 2014). 
 
Tax credit scholarship 
Kansas - Tax Credits 
for Low Income 
Students Scholarship 
Program (2014) 
KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 72-99a01 to -99a07 
(2014). 
Tax credit scholarship 
 
Louisiana - Student 
Scholarships for 
Educational Excellence 
Program (2008) 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 17:4011-4025 (2012). 
State-wide voucher 
 
Louisiana - School 
Choice Pilot Program 
for Certain Students 
with Exceptionalities 
(2010) 
LA. REV. STAT. 
§ 17:4031 (2014). 
Special education 
voucher 
 
 
Louisiana - Tuition 
Donation Rebate 
Program (2012) 
LA. REV. STAT. 
§ 47:6301 (2014). 
Tax credit scholarship 
Mississippi - 
Mississippi Dyslexia 
Therapy Scholarship 
for Students with 
Dyslexia Program 
(2012) 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-
173 (2012). 
Special education 
voucher 
 
Mississippi – 
Mississippi Speech 
Language Therapy 
Scholarship (Nate 
Rogers) Program 
(2013) 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-
175 (2013). 
Special education 
voucher 
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Program Title & Year 
Enacted 
Statutory Reference Program Type 
Mississippi – Equal 
Opportunity for 
Students with Special 
Needs Scholarship 
(2015) 
2015 Miss. Laws 159. Education savings 
account – Special 
education only 
Montana – Tax Credits 
for Contributions to 
Student Scholarship 
Organizations (2015) 
2015 Mont. Laws 457. Tax credit scholarship 
Nevada – Nevada 
Education Savings 
Accounts (2015) 
2015 Nev. Legis. Serv. 
332 (West) 
Education savings 
account 
Nevada – Educational 
Choice Scholarship 
Program (2015) 
2015 Nev. Legis. Serv. 
22 (West). 
Tax credit scholarship 
New Hampshire - 
School Choice 
Scholarship Program 
(2012) 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 77-G:1 to -G:10 
(2012). 
Tax credit scholarship 
North Carolina - 
Special Education 
Scholarship Grants for 
Children with 
Disabilities (2013) 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 115C-112.5 to -112.9 
(West 2014). 
Special education 
voucher 
North Carolina - 
Opportunity 
Scholarships (2013) 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 115C-562.1 to -562.7 
(West 2013). 
State-wide voucher 
 
Ohio - Cleveland 
Scholarship and 
Tutoring Program 
(1995) 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 3313.975–.979 (West 
2013). 
 
City-specific voucher 
Ohio - Autism 
Scholarship Program 
(2003) 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 3310.51–.64 (West 
2011). 
 
Special education 
voucher 
Ohio - Educational 
Choice Scholarship 
Program (2005) 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 3310.01–.17 (West 
2013). 
State-wide voucher 
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Program Title & Year 
Enacted 
Statutory Reference Program Type 
Ohio - Jon Peterson 
Special Needs 
Scholarship Program 
(2011) 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 3310.41–.43  (West 
2014). 
Special education 
voucher 
Ohio - Income Based 
Scholarship Program 
(2013) 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3310.32 (West 2013). 
State-wide voucher 
Oklahoma - Lindsey 
Nicole Henry 
Scholarships for 
Students with 
Disabilities (2010) 
 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
70, §§ 13-101.1–.2 
(West 2010). 
Special education 
voucher 
Oklahoma - Oklahoma 
Equal Opportunity 
Education Scholarships 
(2011) 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
68, § 2357.206 (West 
2011). 
 
Tax credit scholarship 
Pennsylvania - 
Educational 
Improvement Tax 
Credit (2001) 
72 PA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 8701-F–8713-F 
(West 2014). 
Tax credit scholarship 
Pennsylvania - 
Opportunity 
Scholarship Tax Credit 
(2012) 
 
72 PA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 8701-F to 8713-F 
(West 2014). 
Tax credit scholarship 
Rhode Island - Tax 
Credits for 
Contributions to 
Scholarship 
Organizations (2006) 
R.I. GEN. LAW ANN. 
§§ 44-62-1 to -7 (West 
2007). 
 
Tax credit scholarship 
South Carolina - 
Educational Credit for 
Exceptional Needs 
Children (2013) 
S.C. Budget Proviso 
1.80 of 2014-15 
Appropriations Act.31 
 
Tax credit scholarship 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Memorandum from John R. Payne, Dir., Office of Special Educ. Servs., S.C. 
Dep’t of Educ., to Dist. Special Educ. Dirs. and Coordinators (July 10, 2014), 
available at http://ed.sc.gov/agency/programs-services/173/documents/OSES-Memo-
7-10-14Proviso1-80.pdf. 
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Program Title & Year 
Enacted 
Statutory Reference Program Type 
Tennessee – 
Individualized 
Education Account 
Program (2015) 
2015 Tenn. Pub. Acts 
431. 
Education savings 
account – Special 
education only 
Utah - Carson Smith 
Special Needs 
Scholarship Program 
(2005) 
 
UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 53A-1a-701 to 53A-
1a-710 (West 2005). 
Special education 
voucher 
 
Virginia - Education 
Improvement 
Scholarships Tax Credit 
Program (2012) 
 
VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 58.1-439.25 to 58.1-
439.28 (West 2013). 
Tax credit scholarship 
Wisconsin- Milwaukee 
Parental Choice 
Program (1990) 
 
WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 119.23 (West 2014). 
 
City-specific voucher 
 
Wisconsin - Racine 
School Choice Program  
(2011) 
WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 118.60 (West 2014). 
City-specific voucher 
Wisconsin - Wisconsin 
Parental Choice 
Program (2013) 
WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 118.60 (West 2014). 
State-wide voucher 
 
 
Given their controversial nature, it is not surprising that voucher 
programs have been challenged on a number of legal grounds, most 
notably as a violation of federal and state constitutional provisions 
regarding religion.32  Interpreting the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court 
in its 2002 decision Zelman v. Simmons-Harris settled the federal 
constitutionality of voucher programs that permit private religious 
school participation.33  The Court held that such programs are 
permissible as long as: (1) the voucher plan serves a legitimate secular 
                                                                                                                 
 32. See generally Julie F. Mead, How Legislation and Litigation Shape School 
Choice, in EXPLORING THE SCHOOL CHOICE UNIVERSE, supra note 10, at 39–64. 
 33. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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purpose;34 (2) recipients of the aid (parents and children) are not 
defined by religious criteria;35 and (3) parents have available to them 
a “genuine choice” from among a variety of secular and sectarian 
schools.36  Subsequent to this pronouncement, various state voucher 
enactments have been challenged in state courts as violations of state 
constitutional religion and education clauses.37 
Since this study examines vouchers in relation to a child’s right to 
an education, the discussion concentrates on the issues raised 
pursuant to the education clauses of state constitutions.  The next 
Part reviews that case law and the reasoning courts applied to declare 
various voucher, tax credit scholarship programs, or education savings 
account programs either consistent or inconsistent with state 
constitution education provisions. 
II.  CHALLENGES TO VOUCHERS AND TAX CREDIT 
SCHOLARSHIPS UNDER STATE EDUCATION CLAUSES 
State courts in eight states38 have considered challenges to voucher 
programs in relation to state constitutional provisions setting 
legislative requirements for the education of the state’s children.39  
Additionally, plaintiffs have challenged tax credit programs under 
education clauses in Alabama,40 Arizona,41 Florida,42 and New 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. at 649. 
 35. Id. at 653. 
 36. Id. at 662. 
 37. Preston C. Green III & Peter L. Moran, The State Constitutionality of 
Voucher Programs: Religion Is Not the Sole Determinant, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 
275 (2010). 
      38.  (1) Wisconsin: Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998); Davis v. 
Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992).  (2) Ohio: Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 
203 (Ohio 1999).  (3) Colorado: Owens v. Cong. of Parents, Teachers, & Students, 92 
P.3d 933 (Colo. 2004); Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., Nos. 
11CA1856 & 11CA1857, 2013 WL 791140 (Colo. App. Feb. 28, 2013), cert. granted 
Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 13SC233, 2014 WL 
1046020 (Colo. Mar. 17, 2014).  (4) Florida: Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 
2006).  (5) Arizona: Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc); Niehaus v. 
Huppenthal, 310 P.3d 983 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).  (6) Indiana: Meredith v. Pence, 984 
N.E.2d 1213 (Ind. 2013).  (7) Louisiana: La. Fed’n of Teachers v. Louisiana, 118 So. 
3d 1033 (La. 2013). (8) North Carolina: Hart v. State, 2014 WL 6724598 (N.C. Super. 
2014).  
 39. Oklahoma’s voucher program was also challenged. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 5 
of Tulsa Cnty. v. Spry, 292 P.3d 19 (Okla. 2012).  However, the state’s supreme court 
ruled that the plaintiffs (two school districts) lacked standing to bring the suit. Id. at 
20.  Accordingly, it made no decision on the merits of the claim. Id. 
 40. Magee v. Boyd, Nos. 1130987, 1131020, & 1131021, 2015 WL 867926 (Ala. 
Mar. 2, 2015). 
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Hampshire,43 though no decision on the merits was reached in either 
the Florida case or the New Hampshire case, as the reviewing courts 
determined the challenging taxpayers lacked standing to assert their 
claims.44  Not surprisingly, given the recency of their adoption, only 
one state’s education savings account program has been challenged.45 
Decisions concerning all three types of programs are presented here 
in precedential order by state according to the chronology of that 
state’s first judicial decision interpreting the state constitution in 
relation to these parental choice programs.46 
1. Wisconsin  
The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) was first 
challenged shortly after its enactment in 1990.47  The original MPCP 
permitted up to one percent or approximately 1000 of the enrolled 
children in Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) to attend private non-
sectarian schools within the city’s limits if their family’s income was 
no more than 175 % of the federal poverty level.48  Participating 
schools were limited to enrolling no more than forty-nine percent of 
their overall student population by means of the voucher, which 
provided approximately $2500 per student.49  Among other 
allegations, the case considered whether the program violated the 
uniformity clause of the state constitution’s education provision.50  
                                                                                                                 
 41. Green v. Garriott, 212 P.3d 96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). 
      42. McCall v. Scott, No. 2014-CA-2282 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2015). 
http://www.meyerandbrooks.com/documents/McCall%20vs%20Scott/Notice%20Of
%20Appeal.pdf.  Plaintiffs have filed a notice of appeal in the case. See Jeffrey S. 
Solochek, Lawsuit Challenging Florida’s Tax Credit Scholarship Program Continues, 
TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 15, 2015, 3:45 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/blogs/
gradebook/lawsuit-challenging-floridas-tax-credit-scholarship-program-
continues/2233775. 
 43. Duncan v. New Hampshire, 102 A.3d 913 (N.H.  2014). 
 44. McCall, No. 2014-CA-2282; Duncan, 102 A.3d. at 925–28. 
      45. Niehaus v. Huppenthal, 310 P.3d 983 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013), review denied 
(Mar. 21, 2014).  
 46. In other words, states are presented in the chronological order of the first case 
from that state.  Cases for a given state are also presented in chronological order. 
 47. Davis v. Grover, No. 90-CV-25765 (Dane Cnty. Cir. Ct. 1990). 
 48. WIS. STAT. § 119.23(2)(a)(1) (1989-90); Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 463 
(Wis. 1992). 
 49. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 463. 
 50. In addition to the education clause challenge reviewed here, the trial court 
was asked to determine whether the private schools had to serve children with 
disabilities in accordance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; 
whether the bill had been enacted according to constitutionally required procedures 
that prohibit the legislature from passing “private” or “local” bills, WIS. CONST. art. 
IV, § 18; and whether the law comported with the public purpose doctrine, see 
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That provision requires that “[t]he legislature shall provide by law for 
the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform 
as practicable; and such schools shall be free and without charge for 
tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years.”51  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court read this mandate to compel the legislature 
to create “district schools,” but ruled that the private schools 
participating in the MPCP did not become “district” schools merely 
because they received public funding.52  The court reasoned that 
“[t]he uniformity clause clearly was intended to assure certain 
minimal educational opportunities for the children of Wisconsin.”53  
The court reasoned that the MPCP “merely reflects a legislative 
desire to do more than that which is constitutionally mandated,”54 and 
that the legislature’s “experimental attempts55 to improve that 
                                                                                                                 
Warren v. Reuter, 170 N.W.2d 790 (Wis. 1969). Davis, No. 90-CV-25765.  The trial 
court upheld the program against all challenges, and all but the ruling regarding the 
treatment of children with disabilities was appealed and ultimately affirmed by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court. Id. 
 51. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3. 
 52. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 463. 
 53. Id. at 474. 
 54. Id. 
 55. The program characterized as experimental by the Davis court in 1992 has 
changed dramatically since then.  Both religious and non-religious schools may now 
register as MPCP participating schools. 1995 Wis. Act 27, §4002 (July 28, 1995) 
(codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(2)(a) (West 2014)).  There are no longer limits 
on the percentage of students a private school may enroll through the program. Id.  
Likewise, the law now contains no limits on the total number of students from 
Milwaukee who may participate. 2011 Wis. Act. 32 (June 30, 2011).  The schools 
eligible to participate are no longer limited to those physically located within the city 
of Milwaukee, but may be located anywhere in the state. Id. § 2536.  Eligibility for 
low-income families has been expanded from 175% to 300% of the federal poverty 
level. WIS. STAT. ANN. §119.23(2)(a)(1)(a).  Participation in the program has grown 
steadily and now includes 112 participating private schools that enroll a total of 
26,348 students and cost the state approximately $191,000,000. WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. 
INSTRUCTION, MPCP FACTS AND FIGURES FOR 2014–2015 (2015), available at 
http://sms.dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/imce/sms/pdf/MPCP%20Jan%20Facts%20and
%20Figures%202014-15.pdf.  The law was originally enacted by the legislature in 
1989 Wis. Act 336.  Amendments were adopted through: (1) 1993 Wis. Act 16; (2) 
1995 Wis. Act 27; (3) 1995 Wis. Act 216; (4) 1997 Wis. Act 27; (5) 1997 Wis. Act 113; 
(6) 1999 Wis. Act 9; (7) 2001 Wis. Act 16; (8) 2001 Wis. Act 105; (9) 2003 Wis. Act 33; 
(10) 2003 Wis. Act 155; (11) 2005 Wis. Act 25; (12) 2005 Wis. Act 125; (13) 2009 Wis. 
Act 28; (14) 2009 Wis. Act 96; (15) 2011 Wis. Act 32; (16) 2011 Wis. Act 47; (17) 2013 
Wis. Act 8; (18) 2013 Wis. Act 20; (19) 2013 Wis. Act 237; (20) 2013 Wis. Act 256).  
For a full discussion of the MPCP and its statutory history, see Julie F. Mead, Private 
in Name Only: A Statutory and Constitutional Analysis of Milwaukee’s Private 
School Voucher Program, 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 331 (2015). 
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foundation in no way denies any student the opportunity to receive 
the basic education in the public school system.”56 
Six years later, after program amendments permitted private 
religious schools to participate and removed any limitations on the 
number of voucher students a school could enroll,57 the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court re-examined the MPCP and its relationship to the 
Uniformity Clause in Jackson v. Benson.58  Opponents had argued 
that the removal of the cap on the number of students a given school 
could enroll under the voucher program would allow a school to be 
supported entirely by public funds, thus making it a public school, not 
a private school.59  The court rejected this argument, finding the 
proportion of voucher students enrolled in a school irrelevant to 
whether it retained its status as a private school.60  The majority held 
that “mere appropriation of public monies to a private school does 
not transform that school into a district school under art. X, § 3,” and 
that “[t]his conclusion is not affected by the amount of public funds a 
private school receives.”61  The court also reiterated its reasoning that 
so long as the legislature adequately provided for public education, 
the state constitutional requirement should be read as “not a ceiling 
but a floor upon which the legislature can build additional 
opportunities for school children in Wisconsin.”62 
2. Ohio 
In 1999, as the federal case that would eventually lead to the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Zelman was wending its way through the 
federal court system,63 the Ohio Supreme Court considered a 
challenge to the same Cleveland voucher program on state 
constitutional grounds.64  The Cleveland program permitted up to 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 474.   For a discussion of voucher programs and state 
constitutional provisions, see Green & Moran, supra note 37. 
 57. 1995 Wis. Act 27, § 4002 (July 28, 1995). 
 58. 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).  The case also examined “public purpose” and 
religion clause challenges. Id. at 628–30.  The case is best known for the court’s 
analysis of the Establishment of Religion Clause issues raised by the MPCP’s removal 
of the requirement that MPCP schools be non-sectarian.  The court upheld the law 
on all state and federal claims. Id. at 632. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 627. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 628. 
 63. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 64. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 212 (Ohio 1999). 
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$2500 of state funds to pay for a child’s tuition to any private school.65  
The court employed similar logic to that of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court66 to interpret its state’s constitutional mandate that the 
legislature create “a thorough and efficient system of common schools 
throughout the State.”67  While recognizing that “[i]t can be argued 
that implicit within this obligation is a prohibition against the 
establishment of a system of uncommon (or nonpublic) schools 
financed by the state,” the court rejected such an interpretation.68  
Instead, noting that private schools had long existed in Ohio and 
served as an alternative to state-operated schools, the court 
concluded that “[w]e fail to see how the School Voucher Program, at 
the current funding level, undermines the state’s obligation to public 
education.”69  The court did express one caveat, however.  That is that 
public funding for private school enrollment “should not come at the 
expense of our public education system or our public school 
teachers.”70 
3. Colorado 
In contrast, in Owens v. Congress of Parents, Teachers & Students, 
the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the Colorado Opportunity 
Contract Pilot Program violated the state’s constitutional mandate 
that local school boards control publicly funded education.71  Since 
students using the vouchers provided by the program would enroll in 
private schools at public expense, the program created an 
unconstitutional limitation on school board authority over funds 
raised through state and local taxes.72  The court reached this 
conclusion by interpreting two provisions of the Colorado 
Constitution.73  The first provision, article IX, section 2, directs the 
state legislature to “provide for the establishment and maintenance of 
a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 205.  Students whose families had incomes less than 200% of the federal 
poverty level could receive up to 90% of the tuition costs, while children from 
families with incomes above 200% of the poverty level could obtain 75% of tuition. 
Id.  In both cases, the voucher was limited to $2500. Id. 
 66. Id. at 212–13. 
 67. OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 68. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 212. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers, & Students, 92 P.3d 933 (Colo. 
2004). 
 72. Id. at 943. 
 73. Id. at 938. 
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state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six and 
twenty-one years, may be educated gratuitously.”74  The second 
provision, article IX, section 15, grants locally elected school boards 
the “control of instruction in the public schools of their respective 
districts.”75  The court then explained that its earlier precedents had 
clearly established that “control” included jurisdiction over school 
funds.76  As such, the court concluded that the program directly 
violated the explicit local control requirement established in article 
IX, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution.77 
As mentioned earlier,78 the Colorado Supreme Court is currently 
considering the latest challenge to a Colorado voucher program.79  
While the Owens decision foreclosed a state-enacted voucher 
program, it did not address whether a local school board could create 
a voucher program of its own.  In 2011, the school board of the 
Douglas County School District established the Choice Scholarship 
Pilot Program.80  The board set aside funds to provide vouchers to 
local residents who elected to enroll their children in participating 
private schools.81  A group of parents and taxpayers challenged the 
program, and the trial court enjoined the program finding it 
unconstitutional, though not in relation to article IX, section 15.82  
The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the program against all 
challenges.83  Echoing the reasoning of the Wisconsin and Ohio 
courts, the Colorado appellate panel determined that “[t]he 
requirement that the General Assembly create a thorough and 
uniform system of free public education does not preclude a local 
school district from providing educational opportunities in addition to 
and different from the thorough and uniform system.”84  Likewise, the 
                                                                                                                 
 74. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 
 75. COLO. CONST. art. IX, §15. 
 76. Owens, 92 P.3d at 947–50. 
 77. Id. at 943. 
 78. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 13SC233, 2014 
WL 1046020 (Colo. Mar. 17, 2014). 
 80. See Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., Nos. 11CA1856 & 
11CA1857, 2013 WL 791140 (Colo. App. Feb. 28, 2013), cert. granted Taxpayers for 
Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 13SC233, 2014 WL 1046020, at *1 (Colo. 
Mar. 17, 2014). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at *3.  The program was challenged on a variety of grounds including the 
religion provisions of the state constitution. Id. Only the allegations related to the 
education provisions are reviewed here. 
 83. Id. at *21. 
 84. Id.at *9. 
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court rejected plaintiffs’ assertions that the program violated article 
IX, section 3, the state’s constitutional restriction on the use of the 
state school fund.85  The court noted that less than two percent of 
public funding comes from the state school fund and therefore found 
it insufficient to justify enjoining the program.86  Finally, the court 
concluded that since the state had no role in the creation of the 
program and that article IX, section 15 was intended to protect local 
school boards from encroachments on their authority by state 
officials, nothing in the Douglas County voucher program violated 
the constitutional mandates regarding education.87  The Colorado 
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the appeal of this ruling on 
December 10, 2014 and a ruling is expected sometime in 2015.88 
4. Florida 
In 2006, the Florida Supreme Court struck down its statewide 
voucher program, the Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP), 
finding it a violation of the state constitution’s Education Clause.89  
The program allowed children who attended a public school deemed 
substandard by the state’s accountability system to use state monies 
to enroll in any private school, using funds that otherwise would have 
gone to the public school.90  The Florida Supreme Court determined 
that the constitutional mandate to the legislature to create a 
“uniform” system of public education proscribed the OSP because the 
state lacked the necessary control over the private schools.91  
Moreover, the court found that the constitution limited legislative 
discretion such that it must fund public schools exclusively.92  As the 
court explained:  
The second sentence of article IX, section 1(a) provides that it is the 
“paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the 
education of all children residing within its borders.”  The third 
sentence of article IX, section 1(a) provides a restriction on the 
exercise of this mandate by specifying that the adequate provision 
required in the second sentence “shall be made by law for a uniform, 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at *12. 
 86. Id. at *11. 
 87. Id. at *12. 
 88. Eric Gorski, Douglas County Vouchers Argued Before Colorado Supreme 
Court, DENVER POST (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_27108990/
douglas-county-vouchers-head-colorado-supreme-court. 
 89. Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 409–10. 
 92. Id. at 407. 
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efficient, safe, secure and high quality system of free public schools.”  
The OSP violates this provision by devoting the state’s resources to 
the education of children within our state through means other than 
a system of free public schools.93 
5. Arizona 
Although technically not a decision concerning the state’s 
constitutional provisions governing education, a challenge to 
Arizona’s tax credit program merits discussion here.94  The tax credit 
program at issue provided dollar-for-dollar tax credits for any 
corporation that gave a donation to a “school tuition organization,” 
which then provided funds to pay for students’ enrollment at private 
schools.95  The case Green v. Garriott96 considered, among other 
allegations, whether the tax credit program violated Arizona’s 
Enabling Act, which requires that the legislature provide for “a 
system of public schools”97 and that such schools “remain under the 
exclusive control”98 of the state and prohibiting funds “for the support 
of any sectarian or denominational school.”99  Plaintiffs had argued 
that providing funds for private schools through the tax credit 
scholarships violated these provisions of the Enabling Act and 
therefore the state’s “fundamental constitutional responsibility 
toward Arizona’s public schools.”100  The Arizona Court of Appeals 
rejected this reasoning, refusing to accept the premise that the tax 
credit program “expends state resources.”101  Rather, the court 
reasoned the programs do not “siphon[] funds from the public school 
system in order to provide for private, sectarian schools, as the tax 
credit dollars never enter the general fund.”102  Reading both the 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 94. Two other Arizona cases not reviewed here should be noted.  Both challenge 
the state’s tax credit scholarship programs. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 
131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) (holding that taxpayer plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge 
the tax credit programs at issue); Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999) 
(upholding the tax credit program against challenges on religious grounds). 
 95. Green v. Garriott, 212 P.3d 96, 98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). 
 96. Id. 
 97. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. ENABLING ACT, § 20 (West 2001). 
 98. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. ENABLING ACT, § 26 (West 2001). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Green, 212 P.3d at 107. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  The U.S. Supreme Court employed a similar logic in finding that 
taxpayers lacked standing to sue Arizona’s tax credit programs in Ariz. Christian Sch. 
Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).  As the Court explained, “[w]hen the 
government declines to impose a tax, by contrast, there is no such connection 
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Enabling Act and the state’s constitution as limited to public schools, 
the court found them separate from and inapplicable to the programs 
designed to “provide for educational opportunities in non-public 
schools.”103 
It was precisely the expenditure of state dollars that caused two 
Arizona voucher programs, the Arizona Scholarships for Pupils with 
Disabilities Program104 and the Arizona Displaced Pupils Choice 
Grant Program,105 to run afoul of the state’s constitution.  In Cain v. 
Horne,106 the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the traditional 
voucher programs were unconstitutional because they violated the so-
called “Aid Clause.”107  That provision explicitly directs that “[n]o tax 
shall be laid or appropriation of public money made in aid of any 
church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service 
corporation.”108  The court explained that the provision was 
“primarily designed” by the constitution’s framers “to protect the 
public fisc and to protect public schools.”109  The court reasoned that 
the Aid Clause “plainly intended that Arizona have a strong public 
school system to provide mandatory education.  The Aid Clause 
furthers this goal by prohibiting appropriation of funds from the 
public treasury to private schools.”110  Since both voucher programs 
spent state funds for attendance at private schools, the court found 
them unconstitutional.111 
In a 2013 decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the 
current Empowerment Scholarship Account (ESA) when it was 
challenged on similar grounds.112   Under provisions of the statute, 
students with disabilities could receive up to ninety percent of the 
                                                                                                                 
between dissenting taxpayer and alleged establishment.  Any financial injury remains 
speculative.  And awarding some citizens a tax credit allows other citizens to retain 
control over their own funds in accordance with their own consciences.” Id. at 1447 
(citations omitted). 
 103. Green, 212 P.3d at 107. 
 104. The Arizona Scholarships for Pupils with Disabilities Program provided state 
funds for a student with a disability to attend a private school of the parents’ 
choosing. Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1180 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc). 
 105. The Arizona Displaced Pupils Choice Grant Program provided state funds up 
to $5000 for children in foster care to attend private schools. Id. 
 106. 202 P.3d 1178. 
 107. Id. at 1182–83.  The “Aid Clause” is ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10. 
 108. ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10. 
 109. Cain, 202 P.3d at 1183. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1185. 
 112. Niehaus v. Huppenthal, 310 P.3d 983 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013), review denied 
(Mar. 21, 2014). 
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state funds that would have been provided to a public school in order 
to enroll at a private school.113  Funds could be used for tuition or a 
number of other expenses.114  The court distinguished the ESA from 
the programs found unconstitutional by the Cain court, reasoning that 
since the program set up an account for parents, it did not violate the 
Aid Clause.115  Likewise, the court found dispositive the fact that the 
ESA could be used for a variety of purposes, which included but were 
not limited to private school tuition.116  Finally, the court rejected the 
contention that the program was unconstitutional because it 
conditioned a state benefit on the parents’ waiver of their child’s 
constitutional right to a public education.117  The court reasoned that 
“[p]arents are free to enroll their children in the public school or to 
participate in the ESA; the fact that they cannot do both at the same 
time does not amount to a waiver of their constitutional rights or 
coercion by the state.”118  Though plaintiffs appealed to the Arizona 
Supreme Court, it declined to review the case.119 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. at 984 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-2402(C)). 
 114. Id. Eligible expenses included:  
(a) Tuition or fees at a qualified school.  (b) Textbooks required by a 
qualified school.  (c) Educational therapies or services from a licensed or 
accredited practioner or provider . . . .  (d) Tutoring or teaching services 
provided by an individual or facility accredited by a state, regional or 
national accrediting organization.  (e) Curriculum.  (f) Tuition or fees for a 
nonpublic online learning program.  (g) Fees for a nationally standardized 
norm-referenced achievement test, an advanced placement examination or 
any exams related to college or university admission.  (h) Contributions to a 
coverdell education savings account established pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 530 
for the benefit of the qualified student, except that money used for 
elementary or secondary education expenses must be for expenses 
otherwise allowed under this section.  (i) Tuition or fees at an eligible 
postsecondary institution.  (j) Textbooks required by an eligible 
postsecondary institution.  (k) Fees for management of the empowerment 
scholarship account by firms selected by the treasurer. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-2402(B)(4)(a)–(k) (West 2013). 
 115. Niehaus, 310 P.3d at 988–89. 
 116. Id. at 988. 
 117. Id. at 989–90.  The law requires that the parent  “[n]ot enroll the qualified 
student in a school district or charter school and release the school district from all 
obligations to educate the qualified student.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-
2402(B)(2). 
 118. Niehaus, 310 P.3d at 989. 
 119. See Order Denying Petition for Review, Niehaus v. Huppenthal, CV-13-0323-
PR (Ariz. Mar. 21, 2014), available at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/21/Minutes
Current/PR_Min_032114.pdf. 
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6. Indiana 
The Indiana Supreme Court likewise sustained the state’s “Choice 
Scholarship” program, which allows public funds to pay for private 
school tuition.120  To be eligible for a voucher at that time, a student’s 
family income could be no more than 150% of the federal poverty 
level.121  In weighing the meaning the of state’s Education Clause,122 
the court specifically rejected the logic of Bush v. Holmes, finding 
more in common with the reasoning of Wisconsin’s high court in 
Davis v. Grover.123  The court noted that the Indiana Constitution’s 
Education Clause, article VIII, section 1, has two sections: (1) 
establishing “a duty to encourage moral, intellectual, scientific, and 
agricultural improvement;” and (2) an obligation “to provide for a 
general and uniform system of open common schools without 
tuition.”124  The court saw these requirements as separate and distinct, 
and reasoned that the voucher program satisfied the first obligation, 
while the public school system satisfied the second.125  The court 
concluded that “[t]he school voucher program does not replace the 
public school system, which remains in place and available to all 
Indiana schoolchildren in accordance with the dictates of the 
Education Clause.”126 
7. Louisiana 
Although challengers to Louisiana’s statewide voucher program 
persuaded the Supreme Court of Louisiana to their view, the decision 
was narrowly focused on a funding matter that was subsequently 
amended by the Louisiana Legislature.127  In this instance, the court’s 
analysis centered on the fact that the program which provided public 
funds for students to enroll in private schools128 was originally 
designed to be funded through the state’s Minimum Foundation 
Program, the state’s school funding formula.129  The court determined 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213 (Ind. 2013). 
 121. Id., at 1219.  The statute has since been revised to increase the eligibility limit 
to 200% of the federal poverty level. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-51-1-4.3 (West 2013). 
 122. IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
 123. Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1223–24. 
 124. Id. at 1221. 
 125. Id. at 1221–22. 
 126. Id. at 1223. 
 127. La. Fed’n of Teachers v. Louisiana, 118 So. 3d 1033 (La. 2013). 
 128. Id. at 1038. 
 129. Id. 
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that the constitution’s Education Clause,130 which directed school 
funding and limited the authority of both the state legislature and the 
State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, did not permit 
any diversion of those funds away from public schools.131  Since the 
“Student Scholarships for Educational Excellence Program” did 
precisely that, it violated the Education Clause of the State’s 
constitution.132  After the court’s decision, the legislature passed a 
budget to fund the program through means other than the state’s 
school funding formula.133 
8. North Carolina 
In a case134 currently pending before the North Carolina Supreme 
Court,135 plaintiffs asserted that North Carolina’s voucher program, 
the Opportunity Scholarship Program, violates the state 
constitutional requirement that state revenues “shall be faithfully 
appropriated and used exclusively for establishing and maintaining a 
uniform system of free public schools.”136  The trial court agreed and 
enjoined the program from operation.137  The court concluded that 
the program “appropriates funds for education in a manner that does 
not accomplish a public purpose,” since the private schools are 
“unaccountable” to the State Board of Education.138  Moreover, the 
court determined that by enacting the program the legislature had 
failed its constitutional mandate to “guard and maintain” the right to 
an education.139  The North Carolina Supreme Court heard oral 
                                                                                                                 
 130. LA. CONST. art. 8, § 13, (“The State Board of Elementary and Secondary 
Education, or its successor, shall annually develop and adopt a formula which shall be 
used to determine the cost of a minimum foundation program of education in all 
public elementary and secondary schools as well as to equitably allocate the funds to 
parish and city school systems.”). 
 131. La. Fed’n of Teachers, 118 So. 3d at 1056. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Jeff Adelson, Louisiana Budget Compromise Sails Through Both Chambers 
in Last Hours of Session, TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 6, 2013), http://www.nola.com/
politics/index.ssf/2013/06/louisiana_budget_compromise_sa.html. 
    134. Hart v. State, 2014 WL 6724598 (N.C. Super. 2014).  
    135. Matthew Burns, Supreme Court Weighs NC School Voucher Program 
WRAL.COM (Feb. 24, 2015)  http://www.wral.com/supreme-court-weighs-nc-school-
voucher-program/14467107/. 
    136. N.C. CONST. art. IX, §6.  
    137. Hart, 2014 WL 6724598, at *3. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id., citing N.C. Const. art I, §15, which reads: “The people have a right to the 
privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that 
right.” 
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arguments in an appeal of the trial court’s order in February 2015 and 
a decision is expected soon.140 
9. Alabama 
In the most recent decision reviewed here, while the trial court 
voided Alabama’s tax credit scholarship program, the Alabama 
Accountability Act,141 on a number of grounds, the Alabama Supreme 
Court recently reversed that ruling.142  The program permits parents 
whose children attend a “failing school” as identified by the state to 
claim tax credits to fund tuition at a private school.143  The majority of 
the decision considered whether the Alabama Accountability Act was 
enacted in an unconstitutional manner,144 but the decision also 
analyzed its constitutionality under the state constitution’s 
“prohibited appropriation” provision, which forbids funds “to any 
charitable or educational institution not under the absolute control of 
the state” unless the measure is passed “by a vote of two-thirds of all 
the members elected to each house.”145  In invalidating the program, 
the trial court had reasoned that the creation of the tax credit 
scholarship was a legislative attempt to “do indirectly that which it is 
forbidden to do directly”146  and that “[i]f it were possible for the 
legislature by this artifice to avoid the Constitution’s funding 
restrictions, Section 73—and numerous other constitutional 
provisions that place restrictions on the use of public funds—would 
be rendered toothless.”147 The Alabama Supreme Court, however, 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See Burns, supra note 135.  
 141. ALA. CODE § 16-6D-8 (West 2013.). 
 142. Boyd v. Magee, No. 03-CV-2013-901470, 2014 WL 2404288 (Ala. Cir. Ct. May 
28, 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Magee v. Boyd, Nos. 1130987, 1131020, 
& 1131021, 2015 WL 867926 (Ala. 2015). 
 143. Magee, 2015 WL 867926, at *1. 
 144. Id. at *6–18. 
 145. Id. at *31; see also ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 73. 
 146. Boyd v. Magee, No. 03-CV-2013-901470, 2014 WL 2404288 (Ala. Cir. Ct. May 
28, 2014) at *5 (citing Ex parte State ex rel. Patterson, 108 So. 2d 448, 453 (Ala. 
1958)). 
 147. Id.  Interestingly, this reasoning echoes that of Justice Kagan in her dissent to 
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1450 (2011) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting), where she argued that both tax credits and government expenditures are 
forms of governmental subsidy that taxpayers should have standing to challenge. Id.  
As she explained in her disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that taxpayers 
lacked standing to challenge a tax credit program as a violation of the Establishment 
Clause, “[t]axpayers who oppose state aid of religion have equal reason to protest 
whether that aid flows from the one form of subsidy or the other.  Either way, the 
government has financed the religious activity.  And so either way, taxpayers should 
be able to challenge the subsidy.” Id. 
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rejected this reasoning, concluding that “the tax credit is paid to the 
parents of a child who transfers from a failing public school to a 
nonfailing public school or nonpublic school for the purpose of 
offsetting any expenses incurred by the student’s transfer.”148 
Accordingly, the court concluded that “no money is set aside or 
specified from the public revenue or treasury”149 to fund the program 
and therefore it does not offend the state’s constitution.150  
10. Summary 
In total, courts in nine states considered thirteen cases examining 
the constitutionality of vouchers, tax credit scholarship programs, or 
education savings account programs in relation to the state’s 
constitutional provisions governing education.  Each of the cases 
reviewed was a direct facial challenge to the propriety of the program 
under scrutiny.  As discussed, plaintiffs won challenges to programs in 
five cases151 and programs were upheld in eight cases.152  The next 
section discusses themes derived from the cases as a whole. 
III.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
As the brief review of cases dealing with the constitutionality of 
voucher programs vis-à-vis state education clauses shows, the state 
constitutional right to an education is examined with extreme care by 
reviewing courts.  Beyond the judicial conclusions to the particular 
legal questions posed in each case, the interpretation of state 
education clauses brings four distinct issues into focus.  First, the cases 
draw attention to the distinction between a constitutional obligation 
and a discretionary benefit.  Second, the reasoning makes clear the 
relationship between school funding and legislative fulfillment of 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Magee, 2015 WL 867926, at *34. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at *38.  
 151. Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc); Owens v. Cong. of 
Parents, Teachers, and Students, 92 P.3d 933 (Colo. 2004); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 
2d 392 (Fla. 2006); La. Fed’n of Teachers v. Louisiana, 118 So. 3d 1033 (La. 2013); 
Hart v. State, 2014 WL 6724598 (N.C. Super. 2014). 
 152. Magee, 2015 WL 867926; Niehaus v. Huppenthal, 310 P.3d 983 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2013), review denied (Mar. 21, 2014); Green v. Garriott, 212 P.3d 96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2009); Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., Nos. 11CA1856 & 
11CA1857, 2013 WL 791140 (Colo. App. Feb. 28, 2013), cert. granted Taxpayers for 
Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 13SC233, 2014 WL 1046020, at *1 (Colo. 
Mar. 17, 2014); Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213 (Ind. 2013); Simmons-Harris v. 
Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998); 
Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1992). 
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constitutional obligations.  Third, the cases demonstrate that the 
source of a school’s funding does not define its public-ness or lack 
thereof.  Finally, the cases raise the issue of uniformity in the public 
sector as one measure of a legislature’s execution of its constitutional 
mandate.  This Part examines each of these issues in turn. 
Several courts’ analyses rest on the notion that a voucher program 
is an exercise of policy-making discretion beyond that required of the 
state legislature by the state’s constitution.153  That reasoning, while 
upholding various voucher programs, also makes clear that the 
support and maintenance of public education as a means to provide 
each child with a guaranteed right to an education takes precedence 
over the creation of a voucher program that permits private school 
enrollment with public financial support.  As the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court put it, the Education Clause creates “not a ceiling but a floor 
upon which the legislature can build additional opportunities for 
school children.”154  The Ohio Supreme Court was even more direct, 
stating that a voucher program “should not come at the expense of 
our public education system or our public school teachers.”155  As 
such, courts make a clear distinction between the right to an 
education (and the legislature’s obligation to ensure it) and the 
benefit or privilege of a publicly funded private choice.  The first is an 
affirmative obligation; the second is a discretionary option.  This logic 
also suggests that if evidence can be marshaled to demonstrate that 
maintenance of a voucher program meaningfully threatens or 
undercuts students’ right to a public education, the voucher program 
would violate state Education Clauses unless or until the vitality of 
the public school system was restored.156 
Additionally, this reasoning indicates that constitutional 
provisions—even in states that upheld voucher programs—are 
specific rather than general.  That is, a legislature does not satisfy its 
obligations merely by enacting measures relative to education, but 
only by passing laws ensuring public schools and public education.  
Table 2 lists the provisions of each state constitution relative to 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., 2013 WL 791140, at *9; Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 
1222; Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 212; Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 628; Davis, 480 
N.W.2d at 474. 
 154. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 628. 
 155. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 212. 
 156. See Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 212 n.2 (“It is possible that a greatly 
expanded School Voucher Program or similar program could damage public 
education.  Such a program could be subject to a renewed constitutional challenge.”). 
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education for each of the states with a voucher or tax credit 
scholarship program.157 
TABLE 2: STATE CONSTITUTION EDUCATION PROVISIONS FOR 
STATES WITH VOUCHER AND TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP 
PROGRAMS158 
ALABAMA CONSTITUTION  
ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 73 
“No appropriation shall be made to any charitable or educational 
institution not under the absolute control of the state, other than 
normal schools established by law for the professional training of 
teachers for the public schools of the state, except by a vote of two-
thirds of all the members elected to each house.” 
ALA. CONST. art XIV, § 256 
“It is the policy of the state of Alabama to foster and promote the 
education of its citizens in a manner and extent consistent with its 
available resources, and the willingness and ability of the individual 
student, but nothing in this Constitution shall be construed as creating 
or recognizing any right to education or training at public expense, 
nor as limiting the authority and duty of the legislature, in furthering 
or providing for education, to require or impose conditions or 
procedures deemed necessary to the preservation of peace and order.  
The legislature may by law provide for or authorize the establishment 
and operation of schools by such persons, agencies or municipalities, 
at such places, and upon such conditions as it may prescribe, and for 
the grant or loan of public funds and the lease, sale or donation of 
real or personal property to or for the benefit of citizens of the state 
for educational purposes under such circumstances and upon such 
conditions as it shall prescribe.” 
                                                                                                                 
 157. As discussed in Part II, courts in nine of the twenty-four states with voucher 
and/or voucher-like programs have examined the meaning of the language of these 
provisions, while no ruling has yet occurred interpreting the remaining fifteen states’ 
education clauses in relation to these choice programs. 
 158. Emphasis is added to indicate those provisions that are specific to public 
schools and systems. 
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ARIZONA CONSTITUTION  
ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1 
“The legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for the 
establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public 
school system, which system shall include: 
1. Kindergarten schools. 
2. Common schools. 
3. High schools . . . .” 
ARIZ. CONST. art XI, § 6 
“The legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by 
which a free school shall be established and maintained in every 
school district for at least six months in each year, which school shall 
be open to all pupils between the ages of six and twenty-one years.” 
ARKANSAS CONSTITUTION 
ARK. CONST. art. XIV, §1 
“Intelligence and virtue being the safeguards of liberty and the 
bulwark of a free and good government, the State shall ever maintain 
a general, suitable and efficient system of free public schools and shall 
adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the advantages and 
opportunities of education. The specific intention of this amendment 
is to authorize that in addition to existing constitutional or statutory 
provisions the General Assembly and/or public school districts may 
spend public funds for the education of persons over twenty-one (21) 
years of age and under six (6) years of age, as may be provided by 
law, and no other interpretation shall be given to it.”
COLORADO CONSTITUTION 
COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 
“The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the 
establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of 
free public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the 
state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be educated 
gratuitously.” 
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FLORIDA CONSTITUTION 
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 
“The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of 
the State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to 
make adequate provision for the education of all children residing 
within its borders.  Adequate provision shall be made by law for a 
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public 
schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education and for 
the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of 
higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of 
the people may require.”
GEORGIA CONSTITUTION 
GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 
“The provision of an adequate public education for the citizens 
shall be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia.  Public 
education for the citizens prior to the college or postsecondary level 
shall be free and shall be provided for by taxation, and the General 
Assembly may by general law provide for the establishment of 
education policies for such public education.  The expense of other 
public education shall be provided for in such manner and in such 
amount as may be provided by law.”
INDIANA CONSTITUTION  
IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 
“Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a 
community, being essential to the preservation of a free government; 
it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all 
suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural 
improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general and uniform 
system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, 
and equally open to all.” 
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IOWA CONSTITUTION  
IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2d div., § 3 
“The general assembly shall encourage, by all suitable means, the 
promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural 
improvement.  The proceeds of all lands that have been or hereafter 
may be, granted by the United States to this state, for the support of 
schools, which may have been or shall hereafter be sold, or disposed 
of, and the five hundred thousand acres of land granted to the new 
states, under an act of congress, distributing the proceeds of the 
public lands among the several states of the union, approved in the 
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-one, and all 
estates of deceased persons who may have died without leaving a will 
or heir, and also such percent as has been or may hereafter be granted 
by congress, on the sale of lands in this state, shall be, and remain a 
perpetual fund, the interest of which, together with all rents of the 
unsold lands, and such other means as the general assembly may 
provide, shall be inviolably appropriated to the support of common 
schools throughout the state.” 
KANSAS CONSTITUTION  
KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1 
“The legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, 
vocational and scientific improvement by establishing and 
maintaining public schools, educational institutions and related 
activities which may be organized and changed in such manner as may 
be provided by law.” 
   LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION 
    LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 
“The legislature shall provide for the education of the people of the 
state and shall establish and maintain a public educational system.” 
LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13 
“The State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, or its 
successor, shall annually develop and adopt a formula which shall be 
used to determine the cost of a minimum foundation program of 
education in all public elementary and secondary schools as well as to 
equitably allocate the funds to parish and city school systems.” 
MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION 
MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 201 
“The Legislature shall, by general law, provide for the 
establishment, maintenance and support of free public schools upon 
such conditions and limitations as the Legislature may prescribe.” 
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MONTANA CONSTITUTION 
MONT. CONST. art. X, §1 
“(1) It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education 
which will develop the full educational potential of each person. 
Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of 
the state…. (3) The legislature shall provide a basic system of free 
quality public elementary and secondary schools. The legislature may 
provide such other educational institutions, public libraries, and 
educational programs as it deems desirable. It shall fund and 
distribute in an equitable manner to the school districts the state’s 
share of the cost of the basic elementary and secondary school 
system.” 
NEVADA CONSTITUTION 
NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2 
“The legislature shall provide for a uniform system of common 
schools, by which a school shall be established and maintained in each 
school district at least six months in every year, and any school district 
which shall allow instruction of a sectarian character therein may be 
deprived of its proportion of the interest of the public school fund 
during such neglect or infraction, and the legislature may pass such 
laws as will tend to secure a general attendance of the children in each 
school district upon said public schools.” 
   NEW HAMPSHIRE CONSTITUTION 
N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83  
“Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community, 
being essential to the preservation of a free government; and 
spreading the opportunities and advantages of education through the 
various parts of the country, being highly conducive to promote this 
end; it shall be the duty of the legislators and magistrates, in all future 
periods of this government, to cherish the interest of literature and 
the sciences, and all seminaries and public schools, to encourage 
private and public institutions, rewards, and immunities for the 
promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, 
manufactures, and natural history of the country; to countenance and 
inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence, public 
and private charity, industry and economy, honesty and punctuality, 
sincerity, sobriety, and all social affections, and generous sentiments, 
among the people: Provided, nevertheless, that no money raised by 
taxation shall ever be granted or applied for the use of the schools or 
institutions of any religious sect or denomination.”
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NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION 
N.C. CONST. art IX, § 2 
“The General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise 
for a general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall be 
maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal 
opportunities shall be provided for all students.” 
OHIO CONSTITUTION 
OHIO CONST. art VI, § 2 
“The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or 
otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will 
secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout 
the State; but, no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any 
exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this 
state.” 
OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION 
OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 
“The Legislature shall establish and maintain a system of free 
public schools wherein all the children of the State may be educated.” 
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION 
PA. CONST. art III, § 14 
“The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and 
support of a thorough and efficient system of public education to 
serve the needs of the Commonwealth.”
RHODE ISLAND CONSTITUTION 
R.I. CONST. art. XII, §1 
“The diffusion of knowledge, as well as of virtue among the people, 
being essential to the preservation of their rights and liberties, it shall 
be the duty of the general assembly to promote public schools and 
public libraries, and to adopt all means which it may deem necessary 
and proper to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities 
of education and public library services.” 
SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION 
S.C. CONST. art. XI, §3 
“The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and 
support of a system of free public schools open to all children in the 
State and shall establish, organize and support such other public 
institutions of learning, as may be desirable.”
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TENNESSEE CONSTITUTION 
TENN. CONST. art. 11, §12 
“The State of Tennessee recognizes the inherent value of education 
and encourages its support. The General Assembly shall provide for 
the maintenance, support and eligibility standards of a system of free 
public schools. The General Assembly may establish and support 
such postsecondary educational institutions, including public 
institutions of higher learning, as it determines.”
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1 
“The Legislature shall provide for the establishment and 
maintenance of the state’s education systems including: (a) a public 
education system, which shall be open to all children of the state; and 
(b) a higher education system. Both systems shall be free from 
sectarian control.” 
UTAH CONST. art. X, § 2 
“The public education system shall include all public elementary 
and secondary schools and such other schools and programs as the 
Legislature may designate. . . .  Public elementary and secondary 
schools shall be free, except the Legislature may authorize the 
imposition of fees in the secondary schools.” 
VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION  
VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 
“The General Assembly shall provide for a system of free public 
elementary and secondary schools for all children of school age 
throughout the Commonwealth, and shall seek to ensure that an 
educational program of high quality is established and continually 
maintained.” 
WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION  
WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 
“The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of 
district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and 
such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all 
children between the ages of 4 and 20 years; and no sectarian 
instruction shall be allowed therein.” 
 
 
As the emphasized sections demonstrate, the majority of 
constitutions mandate that legislatures create and fund public schools 
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and public systems.  Only Alabama159 and Iowa160 lack constitutional 
language specifically directing the legislature to create and fund 
public schools.  Georgia’s constitution references “public 
education,”161 but makes no mention of “schools” or a “system.”  In 
fact, a review of a listing of all state constitutional provisions 
maintained by the Education Commission of the States reveals that 
only four states (Alabama, Georgia, Iowa, and Vermont162) have non-
specific, rather than specific constitutional provisions with regard to 
public education.163  Why does this specificity matter?  It matters 
because the language creates a constitutional context by which 
legislatures are bound, whatever discretionary programs of school 
choice they may elect to adopt. 
These cases also clearly show that funding is the visible expression 
of a state’s legislative realization of a constitutional goal.  For some 
states, the constitution enshrines limitations on the use of funds for 
educational purposes, including explicitly prohibiting state support of 
private schools.164  But even for those states that found voucher 
programs consistent with constitutional mandates, the funding for 
voucher programs was viewed as an extra educational expenditure.165   
Given the expansion of the various programs (e.g. the MPCP)166 and 
the fact that many of voucher and voucher-like  programs were 
                                                                                                                 
 159. ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256. 
 160. IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2d div., § 3. 
 161. GA. CONST. art. VIII, §1. 
 162. VT. CONST. art. II, § 68 (“Laws for the encouragement of virtue and 
prevention of vice and immorality ought to be constantly kept in force, and duly 
executed; and a competent number of schools ought to be maintained in each town 
unless the general assembly permits other provisions for the convenient instruction of 
youth.  All religious societies, or bodies of people that may be united or incorporated 
for the advancement of religion and learning, or for other pious and charitable 
purposes, shall be encouraged and protected in the enjoyment of the privileges, 
immunities, and estates, which they in justice ought to enjoy, under such regulations 
as the general assembly of this state shall direct.”). 
 163. State Constitutions and Public Education Governance, EDUC. COMMISSION 
STATES, http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/17/03/1703.htm (last updated Oct. 2000). 
 164. Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc); Owens v. Cong. of 
Parents, Teachers, & Students, 92 P.3d 933 (Colo. 2004); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 
392 (Fla. 2006); La. Fed’n of Teachers v. Louisiana, 118 So. 3d 1033 (La. 2013); Hart 
v. State, 2014 WL 6724598 (N.C. Super. 2014).. 
 165. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., Nos. 11CA1856 & 
11CA1857, 2013 WL 791140, at *9 (Colo. App. Feb. 28, 2013), cert. granted 
Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 13SC233, 2014 WL 
1046020, at *1 (Colo. Mar. 17, 2014); Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1223 (Ind. 
2013); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 212 (Ohio, 1999); Jackson v. Benson, 
578 N.W.2d 602, 628 (Wis. 1998); Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 474 (Wis. 1992). 
 166. For a discussion of the expansion of the MPCP, see Mead, supra note 55. 
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enacted (or expanded) during a period when the same legislatures 
made deep cuts in educational funding for public schools,167 the 
question becomes whether support for vouchers has compromised the 
state’s ability to fulfill its obligation to establish and fund district 
schools such that they meet the state legislature’s constitutional duty 
to construct appropriate public education opportunities for the state’s 
children.  Or, to paraphrase the Davis court regarding the Milwaukee 
program: does the state’s expansion and funding of a voucher, tax 
credit scholarship programs, and/or education savings account 
programs result in deprivations to public schools and school districts 
such that the legislature effectively denies students “the opportunity 
to receive the basic education in the public school system[?]”168 
If data provided evidence of such damage, the reasoning of these 
cases would suggest that the voucher or voucher-like program could 
only be funded when adequate financial resources are first directed to 
the public schools.169  It also suggests that future challenges to 
voucher,  tax credit scholarship programs, and education savings 
account programs may take the form of school finance litigation.  
That is, rather than challenging the voucher programs or voucher-like 
programs directly, the litigation strategy may be more indirect, as part 
of an overall constitutional challenge to the state’s public school 
finance scheme.  Plaintiffs may argue that the system of school 
finance is unconstitutional because of the legislature’s commitment to 
subsidies for private education, and the strongest case would be one 
that provided statistical evidence of such a link. 
                                                                                                                 
 167. For example, the Wisconsin legislature cut a total of $792 million of state aid 
to school districts and also reduced local districts’ taxing authority by $1.6 billion over 
a two-year period. 2011 Wis. Act 32 (June 30, 2011); see also JAMES SHAW & 
CAROLYN KELLEY, UNIV. OF WISCONSIN-MADISON ELPA POLICY BRIEF, MAKING 
MATTERS WORSE: SCHOOL FUNDING, ACHIEVEMENT GAPS AND POVERTY UNDER 
WISCONSIN ACT 32 (2012), available at http://elpa.education.wisc.edu/docs/elpa-
documents/shawandkelleypolicybrief.pdf.  In fact, a recent analysis demonstrates that 
the Wisconsin State Legislature now spends 15.3% less on support to local school 
districts when comparing fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2008. Michael Leachman & 
Chris Mai, Most States Funding Schools Less Than Before the Recession, CENTER ON 
BUDGET & POL. PRIORITIES (May 20, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&
id=4011.  That same analysis found the following cuts for other voucher states: 
Alabama (-20.1%), Arizona (-17.2%), Arkansas (-5.2%), Colorado (-7.1%), Florida 
(-3.9%), Georgia (-14.8%), Iowa (-11.7%), Kansas  (-16.5%) Louisiana (-4.1%), 
Mississippi (-13.1%), Montana (-0.9%), North Carolina (-8.6%), Ohio (-0.4%), 
Oklahoma (-22.8%), Pennsylvania (-5.9%), South Carolina (-15.7%), and Utah 
(-5.6%). Id. 
 168. Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 474. 
 169. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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Even if statistical evidence does not substantiate causation, the 
specificity of the constitutional provisions suggests causation is not 
necessary.  As in past challenges to school finance systems that 
asserted legislative violations of state constitution education 
clauses,170 the claimants would assert that the legislature has neglected 
its obligation to equitably and/or adequately fund public schools.171  
They could then point to the existence of a voucher program as 
evidence that the legislature has funds available to support public 
education, but has elected to fund private education instead of 
fulfilling the constitution’s mandate.172  In other words, the 
constitutional obligation to fund public education exists, whether or 
not the legislature has created a private school voucher or voucher-
like program. 
Moreover, in states that have such programs, plaintiffs and the 
judges who may side with them would have new tools available to 
compel legislative attention to correct the constitutional infirmities.173  
For example, as a remedy for the constitutional violation, plaintiffs 
could request that the court enjoin the legislature from expanding 
existing voucher programs, enacting new voucher programs, enrolling 
new students in existing programs, or even funding existing programs 
at any level, until such time as re-investments in public schools correct 
the violations found.  Courts may be less inclined to enjoin 
implementation of tax credits, especially if they view them as a 
decision not to tax,174 but judges likewise may be less persuaded by 
state claims of poverty, since the size of the state fisc was voluntarily 
reduced by the legislature when it created the tax credits in the first 
place.175  As the Ohio State Supreme Court explained: 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See, e.g., DeRolph v. Ohio, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001), vacated 780 N.E.2d 
529 (Ohio 2002); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 746 P.2d 1135 
(Okla. 1987); Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000). 
 171. See DeRolph, 754 N.E.2d 1184; Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., 746 P.2d 1135; 
Vincent, 614 N.W.2d 388. 
 172. As the outgoing chairman of the Wisconsin Assembly Education Committee, 
Republican Representative Steve Kestell remarked, “[n]o one has tried to explain 
how we’re going to fund parallel school programs. Because that’s where we’re 
heading.” Jason Smathers, Outgoing Rep. Kestell Reflects on Legislative Career, 
SHEBOYGAN PRESS, (Sept. 28, 2014, 10:41 PM), http://www.sheboyganpress.com/
story/news/local/2014/09/28/outgoing-rep-kestell-reflects-legislative-career/16408225/. 
 173. For a discussion of the difficulties associated with school finance litigation, 
even for those plaintiffs who prevail, see Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken 
Duties: A New Theory for School Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195 (2011). 
 174. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 
(2011); Green v. Garriott, 212 P.3d 96, 107 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). 
 175. For example, it is estimated that the Alabama Accountability Act will result in 
up to $25 million less deposited to the state’s Education Trust Fund (ETF) each year. 
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We realize that the General Assembly cannot spend money it does 
not have.  Nevertheless, we reiterate that the constitutional mandate 
must be met.  The Constitution protects us whether the state is flush 
or destitute.  The Free Speech Clause of the United States 
Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution, the Thorough and Efficient Clause of the Ohio 
Constitution, and all other provisions of the Ohio and United States 
Constitutions protect and guard us at all times.176 
This link between adequate funding of the public system and 
fulfillment of constitutional obligations also sheds light on the issue of 
school accountability.  Legislatures and voucher proponents often 
declare that the voucher program exists to give students a means to 
exit a substandard public school district.177  While such an approach is 
within some states’ legislative discretion, the primacy of the 
constitutional obligation to create “adequate,”178 “efficient,”179 
“uniform,”180 public schools that provide a “sound basic education”181 
would indicate that legislatures must do more than provide an 
alternative in the form of a voucher.  Whatever the policy arguments 
in support of or in opposition to vouchers , tax credits, and education 
savings accounts, they do nothing to alter the fact that state 
constitutions obligate legislatures to ensure that the public school 
options are of sufficient quality to deliver the right to an education 
envisioned by the framers of the state’s constitution.182  The option to 
choose through a voucher or tax credit, then, is only permissible if the 
legislature has ensured through policy and appropriations that the 
public options are worth choosing.  To fulfill state constitutional 
mandates, a legislature may permissibly have a public school system 
                                                                                                                 
See, e.g., Boyd v. Magee, No. 03-CV-2013-901470, 2014 WL 2404288, at *5 (Ala. Cir. 
Ct. May 28, 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Magee v. Boyd, Nos. 1130987, 
1131020 & 1131021, 2015 WL 867926 (Ala. 2015). 
 176. DeRolph v. Ohio, 780 N.E.2d 529, 532 (Ohio 2002). 
 177. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644–45 (2002); JOHN 
CHUBB & TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990); see 
also Herbert J. Walberg & Joseph L. Bast, School Choice: The Essential Reform, 13 
CATO J. 101 (1993). 
 178. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
 179. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14. 
 180. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; IND. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1. 
 181. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997); Vincent v. Voight, 
614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2000). 
 182. Some courts have concluded that state constitutional provisions create a 
“fundamental” right to an education. See, e.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 
(Ariz. 1973); Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 240 (Miss. 
1985); Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255; Vincent, 614 N.W.2d at 396. 
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without choice, but it may not have choice without first ensuring a 
strong public school system. 
The third pattern apparent in a review of these cases is that 
governance, not funding, dictates whether a school is public or 
private.  Funding alone does not render a school “public” for the 
purposes of the education clauses of state constitutions.183  State 
legislatures may create whatever conditions they wish for private 
schools to participate in voucher and tax credit scholarship programs, 
but that participation does not alter the fact that schools remain 
private schools.  These cases demonstrate the rejection of the 
argument that public funding creates a new form of “district” or 
“public” school.184  Even if, as occurs in Milwaukee, all of a school’s 
students are supported by a publicly funded voucher, that school 
remains private if it was not created pursuant to legislative 
enactment.185 
This recognition evokes the final issue these cases illustrate, that of 
uniformity.  Take, for example, the observation of the Indiana 
Supreme Court that “[t]he voucher program does not alter the 
makeup or availability of Indiana public or charter schools.”186  
Although the court assumed the veracity of its statement, evidence 
may suggest that a voucher program does, in fact, “alter the makeup” 
of traditional public schools. 
The recent complaint by the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) and Disability Rights Wisconsin (DRW) against the 
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction filed with the U.S. 
Department of Justice provides a case in point.187  The complaint 
alleged that the state, through the MPCP, discriminated against 
children with disabilities in violation of Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act188 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act189 by 
implementing a state funded voucher program that was not accessible 
to all children.  The complainants pointed to the small proportion 
(less than two percent) of students with disabilities enrolled in the 
MPCP as compared with Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) 
                                                                                                                 
 183. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 212 (Ohio 1999); Jackson v. Benson, 
578 N.W.2d 602, 627 (Wis. 1998). 
 184. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 212; Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 627. 
 185. See Letter from Tony Evers to Members of the Joint Comm. on Fin., supra 
note 5; see also Mead, supra note 55. 
 186. Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1220 (Ind. 2013). 
 187. See Complaint, supra note 6. 
 188. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–65 (2006). 
 189. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). 
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(approximately twenty percent ),190 arguing that private schools’ lack 
of services resulted in the effective segregation of children with 
disabilities in MPS.191  In April 2013, the Department of Justice issued 
a letter of finding to the State Superintendent, directing the agency to 
take more active steps to ensure that its voucher program was 
implemented in a non-discriminatory manner.192 
The concentration of children with disabilities in the public system 
may also weigh in any uniformity calculus.  High proportions of 
children with disabilities will likely compromise the education of 
children with disabilities because of the high costs needed to meet 
federal requirements,193 and may compromise the education of 
children without disabilities by diverting general funds to meet the 
costly needs of the special education programming.  If a voucher 
program siphons children without disabilities into private schools, 
thereby concentrating students with disabilities and other special 
needs in the public system, has the state effectively constructed a 
public district or districts that are no longer uniform in comparison to 
other public schools?  Each voucher and voucher-like program, 
including the conditions the private schools must meet to participate, 
exists by legislative design.  Academics have long cautioned that 
voucher programs would result in public schools being obligated to 
serve those students whom private schools rejected because of a lack 
of adequate programming.194  However, the means to address this 
problem is a matter of legislative will.  Either the legislature can make 
adequate special programming a condition of private school 
participation, or direct (and fund) existing educational authorities to 
provide those services in private schools that accept vouchers or 
                                                                                                                 
 190. At the time of the complaint, the percentage of students with disabilities 
served in MPCP schools was only 1.6%, while 19.5% MPS students had disabilities. 
Complaint, supra note 6, at 10. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Letter from Educ. Opportunities Section, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Tony Evers, Wis. State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction (Apr. 9, 2013). 
 193. Special education for children with disabilities is governed by the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82 (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300 (2014). 
 194. See, e.g., Julie K. Underwood, Choice is Not a Panacea, 71 EDUC. L. REP. 599 
(1992).  
If a voucher program does not take this into consideration, two things will 
happen.  First, the schools will become segregated in that few handicapped 
or at-risk students will be served in the private Choice schools.  Secondly, 
the costs for the resident public school district will increase as the children 
in need of expensive programs remain in the public schools. 
Id. at 607. 
742 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
participate in scholarship programs.195  If the state-created programs 
do not guarantee non-discriminatory access to children with special 
needs, it is so because the legislature elected not to attend to the 
issue.196  Voucher programs that result in racially isolated public 
schools may likewise “alter the makeup” of public schools.197  The 
history of vouchers as a means to evade desegregation would suggest 
that legislatures may not turn a blind eye to the predictable outcomes 
of subsidizing parental choices.198  Accordingly, the effect of a voucher 
program over time may provide evidence that it subverts, rather than 
serves an appropriate public purpose, and it may suggest that 
“applied” rather than “facial” challenges to voucher programs may 
better litigate the programs’ constitutionality according to state 
constitutional education mandates. 
CONCLUSION 
In reaching its conclusion in Meredith v. Pence, the Indiana 
Supreme Court found “[t]he plaintiffs proffer no evidence that 
maximum participation in the voucher program will necessarily result 
in the elimination of the Indiana public school system.”199  By doing 
so, the court also signaled the constitutional limitation of any voucher 
program.  If plaintiffs challenging a publicly funded voucher or 
voucher-like program can proffer the evidence that maintenance of 
the program results in the elimination of or hinders the delivery of the 
public school system, or even that it evidences the legislature’s willful 
neglect of public schools, state constitutional guarantees would 
suggest the choice program cannot be sustained. 
For it is through those constitutional provisions that states have 
defined what is public about public education including dimensions 
                                                                                                                 
 195. For a discussion of how that might be accomplished, see Julie F. Mead, 
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beyond public funding alone.200  At a minimum, public-ness also 
includes public purpose,201 public access,202 public accountability,203 
and public curriculum.204  Vouchers and neo-voucher programs 
preserve public funding, but diminish or eliminate the other four 
aspects of public-ness.  It is certainly true that parents may not be 
compelled to enroll their children in public schools,205 but it is equally 
true that state constitutions compel state legislatures to create and 
maintain public schools so that they are available to the state’s 
children nonetheless.  In the future, the citizens of a state may elect to 
repeal or revise those specific constitutional mandates and re-define 
public-ness, but unless or until they do, legislatures are bound by 
those provisions, for “custom and convenience cannot contravene 
constitutional constraints.”206  The state constitutional obligation of 
state legislatures to fund and nurture the common public school is 
paramount and may not be subordinated to a legislative desire to 
subsidize the private choices of individual parents.  Legislatures may 
enact private school choice provisions, but state constitutions direct 
that legislatures must provide public schools.  State constitutions have 
clearly established that children have a genuine right to a quality 
public education, not merely the privilege to shop for schooling in the 
educational marketplace. 
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